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As a result of rapid growth in the post—war period, pension plans
have become a major component of the financial structure of large corpora-
tions. A recent survey [5] of 475 of the Fortune 500 companies revealed
that pension cost in 1978 averaged 12.5% of pretax profits and 7.2% of
wages and salaries. Vested liabilities and pension assets averaged 34% and
26% of book net worth, respectively.1 Given a typical debt/net worth ratio of
40% this data implies that pension assets for this group of companies approximate
19% of corporate assets and vested liability is 85% of long term corporate
liability.2 Despite these magnitudes, pension items do not appear on the
corporate balance sheet and little has been known about how pension decisions
are and/or should be made.3
In the past few years there has been a growing interest in pension
policy from a financial management viewpoint.4 At one end of the spectrum
of available literature there is the analysis of corporate pension funds
under the assumptions of perfect markets and equal access.5 For example,
*Iam grateful to Fischer Black, (especially), William Sharpe, Jay Light,
William White and participants in the Finance Research workshop at the
Harvard Business School for helpful discussion and suggestions.
'Market values were dose to book values at this time.
2The ratios for individual companies vary significantly.
3Treynor, etal [111 have demonstrated the importance of integrating the balance
sheets of corporations and their pension funds in analyzing the capital structure
of firms and the value of each claim.
4This has arisen in part from the growth of the private pension system and in
part from the public policy concerns as reflected in the Employees Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The act regulates various aspects of
the major policy decisions facing the corporation; (1) benefit provisions,
(2) funding and (3) investment of pension fund assets. It lso established
the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) which is a quasi—government
corporation that insures pension benefits and has the power within limits to
assess corporations for funding deficiencies in the event of a plan termination.
5See Fama [3] for a review of this framework.—2—
Sharpe [8] demonstrates that funding and investment policy will have
no effect on the value of the total compensation of employees——
current plus deferred wages (pensions)——so long as employees are rational,
the capital market is perfect and individuals and firms have equal access
to it. In this world the firm will have to pay the price of providing
risk—free pension promises; if the funding and investment strategy is
risky, then employees or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation will demand
that the firm acquire insurance to protect their claims or pay them excess
current wages so that they can acquire it themselves.enhe value of tle
compensationpackage is fixed,a it is in Sharpe's case, Black [ii has shown that
the level of funding and the investment policy should not affect shareholder value.
This comes about because investors can offset any corporate asset/liability
decision on personal account. This conclusion can be expanded to a world of
uncertainty, including the possibility of corporate bankruptcy and/or pension
plan termination so long as claimants on the firm (i.e. shareholders,
beneficiaries, bondholders) protect themselves from one another with costlessly
enforced me—first rules which ensure that the characteristics of the payoffs
on the firm's outstanding claims are unaffected by changes in financial
policy (see Fama [3] for the argument as applied to capital structure decisions).
The special tax status of corporate pension plans is a major factor
that is ignored in the perfect markets assumptions underlying these results.
In [9] Tepper and Af fleck concluded that, given the tax status of corporate
pension plans, a firm could enhance shareholder value by borrowing to fund the
pension plan. This strategy would produce an arbitrage situation within the
firm whereby the pension fund would earn a pretax rate of return while the
firm would pay tax—deductible interest on the financing.6 Creditors should
6Thepaper also considered factors other than the tax considerations (e.g. bank-
ruptcy and the priority of claims; these will be discussed in later sections
of the present paper).—3—
not object since, when the balance sheets of the pension fund and the
company are integrated, the net leverage after taxes is decreased. The
only loser is the government. The paper also concluded that an equity—
financed investment of debt in the pension fund would not produce economic
benefits. This strategy omits the tax deduction of interest charges
at the corporate level which produced the arbitraged returns in the
debt—financed strategy. Since the only difference between the two
funding strategies is the source of financing, the results have to be
attributable to an assumed economic benefit of leverage. Given recent
research in the area of corporate capital structure this is a questionable
assumption and any results based upon it must be reevaluated.
The Tepper—Af fleck paper utilized the Modigliani—Miller (MM)
world with corporate taxes (but with no differential personal tax rates
on debt and equity returns). This is a troubling framework because, without the
introduction of bankruptcy costs or other imperfections, the firm should have all
debt and no equity in its capital structure. The case of equity
financing an investment in the pension fund would not even be a relevant
alternative. More importantly, the limitations of the NM framework as a
robust theory of capital structure have been widely recognized. Therefore, any
conclusions regarding corporate pension policy that are based upon it should
be suspect. As will been shown below, and contrary to the conclusions of
the Tepper—Af fleck results, when a more general framework is used, the source
of financing is not the important factor is assessing the desirability of
pension funding; equity is almost as good as debt.
A second tax—related question has arisen. The Tepper and Af fleck
paper analyzed a pension fund investment in debt. Would the advantage to
funding still prevail if the pension fund were invested in equities? At—4—
present equities account for approximately 50% of pension fund invest-
ments and have ranged from a low of 19% in 1950 to a high of 74% in1972.
As discussed above, in the MM framework the advantage topension funding
was attritutable to the tax advantage of leverage.Hence, this advantage
would exist regardless of what the pension fundwas invested in. In
contrast, •in the more general framework used in this paper, tax advantages
exist only when the pension fund is invested in debt.
Finally, the main result of the paper rested upon the assumption
that the contribution to thepension fund was fully deductible at the time
it was made. The paper did not consider in detail what the consequences
of not taking an immediate deduction would be and, as it turns Out, this
is an important practical case if a firm attempted to continually fund above
the level of tax—deductible contributions that is allowed by the Internal
Revenue Service.7 This question is dealt with in theAppendix.
These issues will be elaborated on below. In Section II the
effects of the tax structure on the desirability of having pension
plans and on the funding and investment policies of such plans is discussed.
A setting is used in which pension fund earnings areexempt from corporate
taxation (this assumption is justified in the Appendix) and thepersonal
tax rate on equity returns is less than the personal tax rate on bond
returns. The Miller [6] case in which there is no tax advantage tocorporate
leverage is thus encompassed. The major results of.the analysis are that
pension plans should be fully funded and invested totally in bonds as
opposed to equities (contrary to current. practice).8 These results
follow from the fact that the return on debt held in acorporate
pension fund is passed through the firm to the shareholder and is
The paper showed in a simplified setting that itwas still desirable to make
excess contributions to the fund even if the deductionswere not taken
immediately.
-
8FischerBlack in [2] arrives at the same conclusions. Hisanalysis does
not rely on integration of shareholder and corporateinvestments, as does
mine. He derives the results at thecorporate level.—5—
taxed at the lower personal tax rate on equities; the shareholder willpay
less taxes than if the debt were held in his personal portfolio. Asa result
the shareholder is better off if the pension funds of thecorporations
he invests in maximize their bond commitments through funding and investment
policies and he minimizes them in his personal portfolio. The shareholder
should directly invest in the equities he wishes to hold and the pension funds
of the companies he invests in should not.
The conclusions of this paper are based on the portfolio structure
principles discussed above, not on leverage. Even when there is no tax
advantage to debt the optimal both policy permits the investor to have the
debt/equity exposure he desires and minimizes his taxes. As will be
shown below, the tax benefits of funding that stem from taking maximumadvantage
of differential personal tax rates on debts and equities are larger than
any tax benefit that is attributable to corporate leverage.
Section III discusses the discrepancies between the prescriptions
presented above and current practice. In general, it is found that while
corporations do take advantage of the tax benefits by establishing qualified
pension plans they do not maximize the benefits obtainable in establishing
financial policies for the plan. Pension policy is guided mostly by
considerations involving a breakdown (either real or perceived) in other
aspects of the perfect markets/equal access assumptions.
The Appendix contains a detailed analysis of eaéhof the twotax
•provisions that apply to corporate pension plans. Taken together, these provisions
permit the firm to earn the pretax rate of return on its pension fund investments,
i.e. they result in a complete exemption from taxes on income: this result
is used throughout the paper. Each provision by itself permits a deferral
of taxes. The deferrals amount to interest free loans from thegovernment, and—6—
'the economic benefits that the company derives stem from its ability to earn
interest on these deferrals. It is shown that the sum total of the economic
benefits of these deferrals is a complete tax exemption for the pension fund
income, and that a fairly long time horizon is required before the economic
benefits become significant.
II. Tax—md :ed Effects on Corporate Pension Policy
Corporate pension plans have two major tax provisions: (1) earnings
in thefund are not taxed, (2) contributions to the pension fund (subject
to maximum limitations) are deductible immediately. As shown in theAppendix
these provisions result in a complete exemption of earnings on the pension
fund from corporate taxes; i.e. the pension plan earns the pretax rate of
return. These tax provisions have implications for the full spectrum of
corporate pension policies; (1) funding, (2) investment, (3) benefit provisions.
In this section each of these areas will be discussed. With the
exception of the tax treatment, a perfect market framework is employed in
which it is permissible to think of pension portfolios as an integral part
of the personal portfolios of the shareholders of the firm.9 With equal
access, investors can take positions that offset pension investments. In
the tax area,Miller's [6] world of different personal tax rates on equities
and bond returns is incorporated.
9mis analysis assumes that the firm isa going concern over the horizon of
these contracts. It therefore ignores the risk elements introduced by the
possibility of bankruptcy and/or plan termination (see Treynor, etal [11]).
In general, funding the pension system worsens both the bondholders and
the stockholders position, but while not treated in this paper, the tax
benefits probably swamp these effects.—7—
Funding and investment policy will be treated as interrelated
financial decisions; the value of funding depends on whether the fund is
invested in stocks or bonds. The results will be stated in terms of the
economic gains to the shareholders as was done by Miller. In all cases
treated,a fully hedged position will be created andthenet returns to
the shareholder, if any, will be risk—free. The economic gain will be
these returns capitalized at the after—tax rate of return on personal
debt holdings. This is equivalent to the approach used by Miller and to
his assumption that the streams are perpetuities. The latter requires
that the financial policies analyzed are put in place on a permanent basis.
(More will be said about this in Section III.).
The general principles underlying the analysis are that 1) the
return to shareholders of a debt investment in the pension fund is passed
through the corporation and is taxed at the personal tax rate on equities.
Hence, so long as the personal tax rate on equities is less thanthe
personal tax rate on debt, shareholders would prefer to have theirbondholdings
in the corporate pension fund as opposed to being held in theirpersonal
portfolios; 2) the choice of financing a pension fund investment hingeson
the familiar analysis of where shareholders prefer to borrow——atthe corporate
level or at the personal level. As Miller has stated, witha low personal
tax rate on equities the decision depends upon a comparison of thecorporate
tax rate with the personal tax rate on bonds. The case where there isno
tax advantage to corporate leverage is highlighted in the
follows.
The conclusions that are reached from the analysis below are 1) the
pension plan should always be funded and debt should be the investment
vehicle, so long as personal tax rates on equities are less than that—8—
on debt; 2) debt financing would always be Optimal; equity financing would
be inferior only if there is a positive value tocorporate leverage. If the
clientele effect is operating there will be no optimal financingpolicy.
Case 1: Debt investment; debt financed
The debt investment in the pension fund does not necessitatean
offsetting transaction in personal portfolios since it has been offset at the
corporate level. The economic gain (see Table 1) depends upon the personal
tax rates on debt and equity returns and the corporate tax rate. In equilibrium
they will all be interrelated. When they have values such that there is no
tax advantage to corporate leverage, the after—tax cost to the shareholder
of corporate debt {(l—T) (l—T3)] is equal to the after—tax return (cost)
of personal lending (borrowing)[1_Tb]. When this is true, the shareholder is
indifferent between the company issuing debt and he/she selling bonds or
taking out a loan to finance the investment in the pension fund. The value
of this strategy in this case is simply the value of having thecorporation
invest the pension fund in bonds and passing the returns through to the shareholders
at the personal tax rate on equities. This value is identical to Case3 below.
Case 2: Equity investment; debt financed
In this case,the equity investment in the pension fund increases
the shareholder's total equity holdings. The increase can be offset by re-
ducing equities held in his/her personal portfolio. There are no1:tax effects
since the return on equity is taxed at the personal tax rate whether equities
are held in the pension fund or in the investorTs portfolio. Equity investments
in the pension fund do nothing for the shareholder. The debt that is
taken on to finance this position must now be offset inpersonal portfolios.
Hence, this strategy would not have any value when there is no value to
corporate leverage.—8—
Table 1: Economic Gain of Funding for Different
Investment and Financing Decisions
Corporate tax rate
TpsPersonal tax rate on equity returns
tpbPersonal tax rate on bond returns
II. —= '2; thevalue of corporate leverage.
—= Q thevalue of debt holding in the pension fund vs
in personal portfolios.
III. When there is no value to corporate leverage, ()equals zero. Hence
(l—TPb)=(l_-rC)(l_TPS). This relationship can be solved for and
substituted into show that it is equal to( Alternatively it can be
substituted in 3 to show that the economic gain is equal t0(rC \F. This
l—t )
valueis greater than the value in the disequilibriumworld (F)
See [9], [10].

















Notes: I. F Amount funded—9a—
Table1: Continued
Derivation of Formulas:
Let FSdollar amount of pension fund investment in equity
FDdollar amount of pension fund investment in debt
L additional corporate debt issued to finance pension fund investments
r market interest rate
p return on equity (can be expanded to deal with a portfolio of
individual securities; i.e. can be made a vector of returns)
To derive the economic gains from pension funding, start from a position
where FS, FD, L all equal zero. A non—zero position taken by the firm in
any o these will be offset in personal portfolios to produce a complete
arbitrage. The economic gain to the shareholder (after—tax) is the return
on the pension portfolio, less the cost of additional corporate debt used
to finance the investments, less the costs/returns due to offsetting
transactions in the personal portfolio, all discounted at the after—tax
risk—free rate: i.e.,
Gain= 1 (rF +pFg)(l-T )—rL(l—T )(l—T )—r(F —L)(l--t )—pF(l—T) r(l-t PS)4)
returnon pension cost of corporatecosts/returns of
portfolio leverage offsetting trans-
actions in personal
portfolio.
This general expression can be used to derive the formulas in the table.
To derive formula 3, for example, Let FDF, FO, L=O; then the gain equals,
1 rF+O)(l—T )—O—rF(l—T b°= F(Tpb_Tps)
r(l—T) S P_j
(l_TPb)— 10—
Ifthere is a tax—induced reason to increase corporate leverage
relative to equity it would be more efficient to do so with a capital
structure change as opposed to borrowing and putting the money in pension fund
equities. The latter would increase the exposure of the shareholders and
would require that the latter engage in unnecessary offsetting transactions.
Case 3: Debt investment; equity financed
This strategy involves reducing the amount of investible funds in
shareholder portfolios. Since debt is being held in the pension fund the
shareholder would reduce his holdings of debt in order to maintain a constant
total portfolio structure (i.e. personal plus pension fund holdings). As in
Case I, this transaction has the effect of altering the taxation of the
returns on portfolio debt; the returns would now be taxed at the personal
tax rate on equities as opposed to the personal tax rate on debt. It
is only valuable to the shareholder when the personal tax rate on equity is
lower than that of debt. Its value is identical to the value in Case 1 when
there is no value to corporate leverage; i.e. the bond investment strategy
has a positive value independent of its financing (see footnote III to Table 1).
Case 4: Equity investment; equity financed
The strategy simply involves substituting equities held on personal
account for equities held in the pension fund. As discussed in the discussion
of Case 2 there are no tax induced gains)°
10This result was elaborated on by Scholes [7].— 11—
BenefitPolicy
The tax considerations used above are helpful for assessing whether
the firm should have a pension plan and/or a liberal policy with respect
to granting pension benefits. A simplified model will be used in which
the pension obligation is simply a deferred wage. This approach does
not factor in any incentive effects that may exist with respect to certain
benefit schemes —e.g.final average pay plans —that(especially) salaried
workers often have.11 It lso does not consider the effects of the shifting
of risks from the firm to the employee if a corporate—funded defined benefit
plan is dropped in favor of an employee funded plan which is essentially a
defined contribution plan. With these caveats in places the firm's benefits
policy is determined by the decision regarding how much pension liability
to issue.
Following Sharpe [81, it will be assumed that employees are rational
and are willing to make tradeoffs between current wages and deferred wages
paid out as pensions so long as their economic position is not deteriorated.
With the establishment of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA's) in 1974
as part of ERISA,employees of a firm that does not have a pension plan
can set up their own and receive the same tax status as corporate pension
plans —i.e.deferral of taxes on contributions and deferral of taxes on
earnings in the retirement plan. Therefore, the employee will earn the same
pre—tax rate of return the firm does and would use a pretax risk—free rate
of return in establishing current/deferred wage tradeoffs.L The other side
The existence of incentives has been questioned. In a rational economic
model only the deferred wage aspect can be identified. See Sharpe [8].
12
An equilibri risk/retu tradeoff is assumed to exist in thecapital
markets and, for simplicity, comparison of alternatives is made uniformly
at the risk—free rate.— 12—
ofthis is that the risk—adjusted cost of funds raised by the firmvia
issuing pension liabilities is the pre—tax rate of return. Since the
firmearnsthe pretax rate on pension assets the best it can do is to
stay even either by having a fully funded pension plan or by having
no plan at all and letting the employees establish IRA's.
In this simple analysis certain factors have been omitted. Forexample,
it has been implicitly assumed (as was done in the analysis ofcorporate
plans) that no changes in the employee's tax rate takes place from the
time contributions are made to the time they are withdrawn. If thetax rate
at which contributions are made is higher than the tax rate applied to with-
drawals then the employee would be willing to accept a lower rate ofreturn.
It is almost certain that the tax rate will decline at the time theemployee
retires since retirement income does not usually equal incomejust prior to
retirement. However, the employee will be making contributions to the IRA
throughout his lifetime and it is not clear that, on balance, he/she will be
contributing at a higher rate than the rate that would apply during the with-
drawal period. In the earlier years of thecareer, real income and investible
wealth will be lower; for home owners their deductions will be higher. Add
to that the effects of-inflation on the individual's tax bracket and it is
not at all clear whether, on balance, the tax rate in the accumulation
period is higher or lower than the rate in the decummulation period. To
the extent that it is higher, the benefit of a pension plan will be diminished
but not eliminated.
Another factor which might affect the employee's position isthe
$1500 limit on contributions to the IRA. This limit would bereached for
high—salaried employees if the formulas determining the level of contribution—13—
were based on reasonable replacement ratios for income in retirement. Congress
is currently studying increases in I limits so that this may not be a factor
In the near future.
With these caveats in mind, unfunded pension liability is likely
to be an expensive source of funds relative to debt if employees evaluate
their opport"nities rationally. Pension plans are encouraged by the tax
structure and employees can provide them for themselves o go to a company
that does.
III. Concluding Remarks
Corporate pension policies in practice today divergesignificantly
from the prescriptions presented above. As the dataat the beginning of
this paper indicate, firms have raised a substantialamount of funds through
the issuance of pension liabilities. Theydonot appear to maximize the fund-
ing of their pension systems and they invest a substantialportion of the
fund (currently about 50%) in equities. Someexplanations of these phenomena
are presented below.
Unfunded pension liabilities would be a costly source of funds
because competing firms would take advantage of thetax structure and
would provide fully funded plans. In the absence ofcompetitors, the
employees could establish an IRA and take advantage of the taxprovisions
thems&Ives. The IRA type of pension scheme came aboutas part of ERISA
in 1974, long after most firms established theirplans and accumulated the
bulk of the existing liabilities. Prior to 1974 thetax situation was more
favorable to corporate pension schemes in that employees wouldhave accepted
a lower rate of return between current wages and supplements a:.d deferred
pension benefits. The fact that the company bears the investment risk in— 14—
definedbenefit plans, not the employees, would also be an important factor if
the choice was between a company plan and an IRA.
While it is often said that firms minimize their pension outlays,
this is not true. The majority of firms use actuarial procedures that produce a
required pension contribution in excess of the minimum they could get away
with. Among the several actuarial cost methods that are acceptable, the one
that produces the lowest level of contributions is designed to fund benefits
as they accrue. Most firms elect one of the other, more liberal methods and
hence pre—fund benefit accruals. In addition to higher costs, this procedure
results in a buildup of a relatively permanent level of assets in the pension
fund in excess of what is needed to cover benefit accruals (see Trowbridge [121).
In addition, many firms use conservative actuarial assumptions and this has the
effect of further prefunding benefits.
The result is that many firms do accelerate funding by the choice
of methods and assumptions over long time periods and this results in signifi-
cant tax—induced gains. However, considerations other than the tax structure
dominate this decision. The two most—often mentioned are benefit security
and cost stabilization. The actuarial profession has been the dominant force
in promoting these considerations and in developing the pension cost procedures
that produce preserves?! which make satisfaction of these goals possible. It
is true, however, that within the established actuarial framework, firms
typically minimize pension contributions. Changes in funding in this instance
would not be permanent and hence would not accumulate to the maximum possible
tax benefit (see Jackson [4]).
A number of explanations exist as to why firms do not consider
the tax benefits to be a major factor. First, even though in the general equi1ibrium
analysis presented in this paper there will be an advantage to shareholders— 15—
evenif corporate tax rates change,managers who focus on their own
company's financial performance will be concernedabout such a possibility.
In general, falling corporate tax rateswill be good and risingcorporate
tax rates will be bad. Inflation and other
social/economic effects will
cause rates to rise but tax legislationcan lead to reductions. It is
not clear what corporate tax rates will beover the long run. Secondly,
prefunding the pension system enhances the economicposition of the
participants to the detriment of the suppliers ofcapital, since the wealth
in the pension fund cannot bebrought back into the firm. Thirdly, the
firmmay beresource—constrained; i.e. it may not be able to freely
raise the capital needed internally andalso fund the pension plan. This
argument runs counter to the perfect marketsassumptions utilized above.
Fourthly, it is often argued that pension fundinvestments have not kept'
pace with inflation and hence that it ispoor investment. This argument fails
to consider the inflation—induced gainson the financing side of pension
fund investments. In the arbitragedscheme utilized in thispape; gains
and losses due to inflation arefully hedged. (For a further discussion
the points raised in thisparagraph see {9] and [10].).
Finally, the investment of pension fund assets inequities can only
be rationalized by appealing to violationsof the perfect markets assumptions
ëtnployed herein and/or to the failure of management to considerand understand
the value of having bonds in the pension fundgiven the economic opportunities
of its shareholders. Theseproblems are central to many issues incorporate
finance and are not dealt with herein.— 16—
Appendix
Taxes and Rates of Return on Pension Fund Investments
The bulk of corporate pensions are qualified by the Internal
Revenue Serivce to receive special tax treatment. Specifically, contribu-
tions to the pension fund, subject to maximum limitations, are deductible
at the time they are made and earnings on pension fund investments are
not taxed. When the maximum deductible limit is not constraining the
corporation earns the pension fund's pre—tax
ment of its contributions. The return comes
contributions in the future. The purpose of
each of the tax provisons.separately and to
rate of return on the invest—
in the form of reduced pension
this appendix is to examine
assess their relative importance.
It is important to recognize that each of the two tax provisions
taken separately results in a deferral of taxes (but that together they
amount to a complete exemption of pension fund income from tax). All
contributions to the pension fund will eventually be deductible as a
business expense. If a deduction is taken when a contribution is made
then that deduction cannot be taken in the future. Hence, current taxes
are reduced and future taxes are increased.13 Similarly, not paying taxes
on pension fund earnings at the time they are earned will result in an
eventual tax payment on these earnings. At some point in the future,
contributions to the plan will be reduced by an amount equal to the accumula-
tion of untaxed income (assuming the plan's liabilities are unchanged).1-4
At that time taxable income will increase by this amount and hence taxes will
be paid. on it. These deferrals are interest free loans from the government and
the general rule is that the gain to the firm is equal to the after—tax
interest that accumulates on the deferral.
13This is analogous to tax shelter deals.
'4The funding patterns and the adjustments made to them as a result of altering
contribution schedules and/or the accumulation of pension fund earnings are
determined by the plan's actuarial cost methods.—17—
In measuring the amount of the economic benefit of these deferrals
a bond investment in the pension fund is assumed and the benchmark used will
be that of a riskiess corporate investment where the firm pays taxes on
returns in each period and, therefore, earns the after—tax rate of return.'5
The first situation considered is where the deferral of taxes on pension
fund investment earnings is permitted but where deductions of contributions
cannot be taken when the contribution is made.16 The contributions will
accumulate in the pension fund at the (pretax) rate of return and at some
point in the future contributions will be reduced——and pretax profits
will increase——by this accumulated value. At that time the company will
receive a deduction for the contribution it initially made so that it would
only pay tax on the accumulated earnings in the fund. Using a simplified
framework, let,
r the (pretax) rate of return in the pension fund; assumed to
be in bonds for comparison with a riskiess corporate investment.
Etheyear in which contributions are reduced by the pension
fund accumulation on a contribution made at time 0.
Tccorporatetax rate.
Then, for a dollar invested in the pension fund the firmearns,after—tax,
(l+r)tt —rc[(l+r)nl_lJ
over the period of n years. The value of the tax
deferral of earnings is the difference between this amount and the amount that
would have been accumulated if the dollar had been placed in an investment in
which earnings were taxed year—by—year.
value of tax =(l+rf'—T{(l+r)n_l] —[l+r(1_T)]"
(1)
deferral of earningsc
arrangement is chosen so that the comparison can be made on a risk—free
basis. There are a number of investment alternatives where the corporation
can defer the taxes on at least some part of its returns. However these
alternatives are rarely as riskiess as are bonds held in the pension fund.
16This is the relevant case for contributions made in excess of the maximum
tax—deductible limit. It is important since actuarial procedures permitted
by the IRS do significantly limit the amount that can be deducted in a given
year. See Jackson [4].— 18—
Thevalue of the tax deferral stems from the compounding of investment
earnings at the pre—tax rate of return and then paying the tax only on
the interest accumulated. The economic benefit is equal to the after—tax
accumulated interest on the deferral of tax payments on interest earned.
This is shown next.
The tax deferral in period (t) is equal to the tax that would
have been paid on the return on the firm's investment in that period.
The firm's investment in that period is the amount that would have
accumulated had the firm been paying taxes on earningsup to that point.
The deferral will accumulate interest from period (t) to period (n)at
which t:fine taxes are paid on the accumulated interest. The after—tax
return on the sum of each period's deferral is given by
E r r [l+r(l—T )]t_l (l—r )[(l+r)t_l]
tax deferral in t after—tax return on the
deferral in t
which is equal to
(l-t) [(l+r)n -(l+r(l-T))J+ t[l— (l+r(l—T))]
which is equal to equation (1).
In the second situation, contributions can be deductedimriediately, in addi-
tion toearnings not being taxed, Every dollar of thefirm's after•taxinvestment
in the pension fund is augmented by the deferred taxpayment T/(l—T), so that
the pension fund has a total amount invested of l/(l—). Thisamount
accumulates at the pension fund rate of return over the ayears at which time
the contribution is reduced. The full value of this accumulat:on istaxable
since the deduction for the contribution has already been taken. The firmearns,
after—tax, an amount equal to (l_Tc)(lIl_T) (l+r), so that with both—19—
tax deferrals operating the firm earns the pre—tax rate of return on the
pension fund.17 The value of the deductibility of contributions given by
equation 2 below can be established by subtracting from this accumulated
return on investment the return the firm would earn in the previous case
where only taxes on earnings are deferred.




This amount is the after—tax return accumulated on the tax
deferral resulting from the deduction of the contribution since the contribu—
T
tion of $1.00 resulted in a deferral ofC dollars and the after—tax return
l—T
C
on the deferral is
T
c .(l—T )[(l+r)—1] c
c
17Anotherway of saying this is that the return on the pension is equivalent
to a return on corporate investments in which no taxes are paid. Therefore,
only if the firm has riskless investment opportunities similar to bonds
in the pension fund in which taxes on the returns are deferred for significant
time periods so that it effectively earns close to the pre—tax rate, will
the pension fund will not be as attractive a use of funds and the tax
provisions will not be much of an incentive.— 20—
Figure1 shows the values of each of the two tax deferral provisions
for a pension fund return of 10% and a corporate tax rate of 50%. It shows
that when the deferral period is short the deferral due to the deduction
of contributions dominates. The deferral of taxes on earnings is not
important when an immediate deduction is not allowed because the accumulation
of earnings is small relative to the principalinvested. Taken together
the two tax provions amount to an exemption of taxes independent of the
horizon. The tax on, earnings deferral begins to become significant when
the deferral period approximates ten years. It increases the dollar
ieturn on the company's investment at the end of ten years by approximately
10% which is equivalent to an increase in the compound return from the
after—tax rate at 5% to approximately 6%. This effect is approximately 20%
of the total return enhancement that takes place when both tax deferral
provisions takes place. It takes approximately 50 years before the impact












Figure1: Accumulated Values and Compound eturr. foran Investment
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